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Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a
virtue about games. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to
you who laugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not only
excessive, games should be avoided." Now that which can be done virtuously is
not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a virtue about
games.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us," as stated above (FS, Question [55], Article [4]). Now Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.]: "It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun. Listen to what happened to those who played: 'The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.'" Therefore there can be no virtue about games.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic.
x, 6) that "playful actions are not directed to something else." But it is a
requisite of virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his action to
something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore there can
be no virtue about games.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I
pray thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax
the high pressure of his attention to work." Now this relaxation of the mind
from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a wise and
virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times. Moreover the Philosopher
[*Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8] assigns to games the virtue of {eutrapelia}, which we may
call "pleasantness."
I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for
the body's refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is
finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it with his soul,
whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of work. Consequently
when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work, he is oppressed and becomes
weary, and all the more since when the soul works, the body is at work likewise,
in so far as the intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily
organs. Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul
arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there
results in consequence a certain weariness of soul, whether the operations with
which it is occupied be those of the practical or of the speculative reason. Yet
this weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work of
contemplation, since thereby it is raised higher above sensible things; although
perhaps certain outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily
labor. In either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than another,
according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as
weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul
must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul's rest is pleasure, as
stated above (FS, Question [25],
Article
[2]; FS, Question [31],
Article
[1], ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs
consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening the tension of the
reason's study. Thus in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21, it is related
of Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on
finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have told one of
them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this
several times, he asked him whether he could do it indefinitely, and the man
answered that if he continued doing it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed
John drew the inference that in like manner man's mind would break if its
tension were never relaxed.
Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought
than the soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is necessary
at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul.
This is in agreement with the statement of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that
"in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that is associated with
games": and consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such
things.
Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three
points which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the pleasure
in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words.
Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one kind of joke is discourteous,
insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another thing to be observed is that one lose
not the balance of one's mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20):
"We should beware lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that
harmony which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i, 29),
that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in their
games, but only that which is consistent with good behavior, so our very fun
should reflect something of an upright mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in
all other human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and
take due account of other circumstances, so that our fun "befit the hour and the
man," as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).
Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason:
and a habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there can be
a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness
({eutrapelia}), and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy turn* of
mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this
virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty.
[*{Eutrapelia} is derived from {trepein} = 'to turn'].
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, fun should
fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17)
that "when the audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try
something novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the
gravity of the subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the
greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, "Hear, for I will speak of great
things." Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech,
but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: "Although jokes are at
times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the
ecclesiastical rule; since how can we have recourse to things which are not to
be found in Holy Writ?"
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Chrysostom
refers to the inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure
of games their end; of whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): "They have accounted our
life a pastime." Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "We are so begotten
by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun, but rather for
hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and moment."
Reply to Objection 3: Playful actions themselves
considered in their species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived
from such actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and
accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use of fun.
Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to make use of play and
fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest,
then only when we have done our duty by grave and serious matters."
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Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin
in the excess of play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be
sinful. Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be grave
sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they be done in fun, are either no
sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there is no sin in excessive
play.
Objection 2: Further, all other vices are reducible
to the seven capital vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of
play does not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would
seem not to be a sin.
Objection 3: Further, comedians especially would
seem to exceed in play, since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore
if excess of play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover
all those who employ them, as well as those who make them any payment, would sin
as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue; for it is related in
the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii. 63) that is was revealed to the Blessed
Paphnutius that a certain jester would be with him in the life to come.
On the contrary, A gloss on Prov. 14:13, "Laughter
shall be mingled with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy,"
remarks: "A mourning that will last for ever." Now there is inordinate laughter
and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein,
since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.
I answer that, In all things dirigible according to
reason, the excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which
falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated (Article [2])
that playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason.
Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of reason: and this
happens in two ways. First, on account of the very species of the acts employed
for the purpose of fun, and this kind of jesting, according to Tully (De Offic.
i, 29), is stated to be "discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene," when
to wit a man, for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or
such as are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins.
And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.
Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due
circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue times or
places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This may be
sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to play, when a man
prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love of God, so as to be
willing to disobey a commandment of God or of the Church rather than forego,
such like amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for instance where
a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its sake to do
anything in disobedience to God.
Reply to Objection 1: Certain things are sinful on
account of the intention alone, because they are done in order to injure
someone. Such an intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention
of which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from sin, or
diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to their species, such
as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is no excuse for these; in fact
they make fun scandalous and obscene.
Reply to Objection 2: Excessive play pertains to
senseless mirth, which Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony.
Wherefore it is written (Ex.
32:6): "The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated (Article
[2]), play is necessary for the intercourse of human life. Now whatever is
useful to human intercourse may have a lawful employment ascribed to it.
Wherefore the occupation of play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the
heart of man, is not unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided
that their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or deeds
in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into undue matters and
seasons. And although in human affairs, they have no other occupation in
reference to other men, nevertheless in reference to themselves, and to God,
they perform other actions both serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the
moderation of their own passions and operations, while sometimes they give alms
to the poor. Wherefore those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act
justly, by rewarding them for their services. on the other hand, if a man spends
too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who practice unlawful
mirth, he sins as encouraging them in their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract. c.
in Joan.) that "to give one's property to comedians is a great sin, not a
virtue"; unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case
one would have to assist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic. [*Quoted in Canon
Pasce, dist. 86]): "Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst save a
man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him."
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Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sin in
lack of mirth. For no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of
a penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: "Let him refrain from
games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to obtain the grace of a full
pardon." Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth.
Objection 2: Further, no sin is included in the
praise given to holy men. But some persons are praised for having refrained from
mirth; for it is written (Jer. 15:17): "I sat not
in the assembly of jesters," and (Tobias 3:17): "Never have I joined myself with
them that play; neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in
lightness." Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.
Objection 3: Further, Andronicus counts austerity
to be one of the virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither
gives nor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack
of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv,
8) reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice.
I answer that, In human affairs whatever is against
reason is a sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others,
by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore
Seneca [*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De Continentia] says (De
Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): "Let your conduct be guided by wisdom so that
no one will think you rude, or despise you as a cad." Now a man who is without
mirth, not only is lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others,
since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are vicious,
and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv,
8).
Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and
pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are not in
quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as stated in Ethic. x,
6, it follows that "lack of mirth is less sinful than excess thereof." Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): "We should make few friends for the sake of
pleasure, since but little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little
salt suffices for our meat."
Reply to Objection 1: Mirth is forbidden the
penitent because he is called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a
vice in default, because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in
accordance with reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Jeremias speaks there in
accordance with the times, the state of which required that man should mourn;
wherefore he adds: "I sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats." The
words of Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his adding:
"Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness."
Reply to Objection 3: Austerity, as a virtue, does
not exclude all pleasures, but only such as are excessive and inordinate;
wherefore it would seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic.
iv, 6) calls "friendliness," or {eutrapelia}, otherwise wittiness. Nevertheless
he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with temperance, to
which it belongs to restrain pleasure.